The Peterloo Massacre - The Conclusions

Chapter Six

Concluding Peterloo

Throughout this book I have used the relevant historiography and selected contemporary sources, to illustrate the diversity of opinion about Peterloo and to suggest that many of the myths associated with this event are of questionable historical validity, or, that at least, there are other more plausible well documented interpretations and eyewitness accounts that warrant equal consideration.
In 1819 Manchester was only one of several industrial centres where unenfranchised working men had organised themselves into clubs to discuss political topics, to make plans for a constitutional reform of Parliament and to hasten this reform by means of demonstrations which were intended to persuade the ruling class. The industrial towns in Lancashire looked to Manchester to take the lead. Here the reform movement was more vigorous but was also more carefully watched by the local magistrates.
In 1815, the ruling classes in Britain were still convinced that only they were fit to rule and their interests were those of society as a whole. Therefore when Britain entered the economic crisis after the close of the Napoleonic War in 1815, the aristocratic rulers of Britain concentrated on protecting their own property and repressing all threats to their position of power and authority. There is no doubt that the Government and the ruling classes still believed in the possibility of a popular revolution similar to the savage French revolution that had taken place twenty years earlier. Their official reaction was to repress all agitation rather than to deal with the causes of it.
By 1815 the parliamentary system in Britain had almost gone back to the Middle Ages, certainly not reflecting the needs of the rapidly changing society. Altogether there were ‘658 MPs in the House of Commons’ but how they were elected was to come under close scrutiny. This is largely because there were no independent MPs representing the new expanding industrial centres like Manchester and her surrounding towns. The working classes blamed their misery on misgovernment and the fact that they had no proper representation in parliament to redress their grievances. They could see Manchester, Salford, Bolton, Blackburn, Rochdale, Bury, Ashton-under-Lyne, Oldham, and Stockport had no members, whilst a host of small villages with only a few inhabitants often had two MPs.
As we have seen by 1819, deference had been considerably weakened in whole regions of England by Dissent, Methodism and also challenged by Luddism the Hampden clubs and the Union Societies. In addition Radical activity in Lancashire in 1819 was particularly strong. This was due to a Radical Press, Radical mass meetings, Radical schools and societies and of course the Radical programme itself. This largely explains although it does not justify the fear and panic of the local authorities at Peterloo. On the one hand the Manchester magistrates were more concerned with what was happening in Lancashire, whilst on the other Lord Sidmouth and the government at Westminster could see a pattern of Radical activity throughout the country. Therefore by 1819 the Radical background to Peterloo can only be described as being nation-wide.
It was demonstrated in Chapter One that the policy in Regency England was to call on the regular army in troubled times to act as a police force but the main representatives of law and order were the local magistrates, many of whom, like the Manchester magistrates, belonged to an elite oligarchy having little sympathy with the working-class or even with the new smaller mill owners. Their main anxiety was that there would be an assault on property by the mob. Because there was no organised police force, they often swore-in special constables or asked the Home Secretary Lord Sidmouth to authorise the use of the regular army. There is no doubt that this policy was adopted by the Manchester authorities before the Radical reform meeting held on 16th August 1819. In fact preparations by the Manchester authorities were very similar to those made the day before the Blanketeers meeting held in St Peter’s Field in 1817.
During the summer of 1819 there occurred a mass mobilization of popular support for political reform. This was reflected by the fact that the weeks leading up to Peterloo witnessed lots of small meetings followed by more impressive demonstrations in regional centres like Manchester, in June and in Birmingham, Leeds and London in July. In addition there had been a number of reform meetings held in various parts of Lancashire over the previous, two months. These meetings took place at Oldham, Ashton and Stockport in June, followed by Blackburn, Rochdale, Macclesfield, in July, and Leigh in early August. These meetings were a clear demonstration of the extent of popular support which the Radical Reform Movement enjoyed. It also showed how well the movement was organised, with Reform Unions drawing massive crowds much to the alarm of the Manchester authorities.
There seems little doubt that the radical reformers on the one hand and the loyalists on the other expected some form of confrontation to tip the balance in their favour. Therefore, it is not surprising that the animosity between them was becoming very intense. It was against this background that the mood was set for the August meeting which was the climax of a series of political meetings held in Manchester, and its surrounding districts in 1819, a year of industrial depression and high food prices. The organisers intended that a mass meeting would be a great peaceful demonstration of discontent and its political purpose was to put pressure on the Central Government to bring about parliamentary reform. In the words of Donald Read:

There can be no doubt that the condemnation of William Hulton and the Special Select Committee of Magistrates is justified. Nobody can deny what the mass meeting was all about. The radical protesters were carrying banners demanding-Universal Suffrage, No Boroughmongering, and No Corn Laws. Hulton and the Regency Tories refused the masses their political rights, and also expected many of them to acquiesce in near starvation caused by the deep post-war economic depression.

In Chapter Two it was demonstrated that a massive crowd attended the reform meeting in St Peter’s Field including a high proportion of women and children. None of them were armed and their conduct was peaceable. The Select Committee of Magistrates who were obviously nervous before the meeting and alarmed at the size and discipline of the crowd so they ordered the Manchester Yeomanry to arrest the speakers on the Hustings immediately after the meeting began. The fact that the Manchester Yeomanry were the first on the field was the last link in the chain of events leading up to the Peterloo massacre. These men were ardent in their politics, and had suffered from the taunts of the Radicals. There was also a feeling in the air that they were not likely to show much moderation in a crisis. In addition their prejudices had been further aggravated by the fact that during the morning of the 16th, ‘while gathering in the taverns to have their boots cleaned and their horses curried, [currie combed] they had become half-drunk.’ The unrestrained Manchester Yeomanry did not then confine themselves to seizing the speakers, but instead, wielding their sabres, made a deliberate and general attack on the crowd. William Hulton, the Chairman of the Select Committee of Magistrates, then ordered the 15th Hussars and the Cheshire Yeomanry to rescue the Yeomanry and disperse the defenceless crowd. Reports indicate that within the space of 10 minutes St Peter’s Field was cleared except for the bodies of the dead and injured.
The popular belief that there had been no premeditation by the Select Committee of Magistrates to disperse the meeting by force and that the magistrates were only guilty of incompetence or ill-judgement and everything happened by chance is contradicted by the evidence. In fact two days before the meeting the Reverend Mr Hay stated that magistrates were satisfied that the meeting ‘if assembled as it was expected, would be an illegal Meeting.’ Therefore, although the magistrates had no power to prohibit the meeting beforehand, they assumed that it would turn out to be illegal and made plans to disperse it by the use of civil and military force. The forces were assembled and warrants were issued to arrest the speakers before the meeting began. The popular belief that is developed in the historiography that most of the injuries were caused by the fleeing crowd crushing one another is simply a myth. Evidence was presented in Chapter Two has shown that most of the injuries were caused by the use of sabres and truncheons and the use of cavalry rather than by the crowd itself. The belief that the 15th Hussars only used the flats of their swords is equally fanciful. Evidence has shown that although the Hussars showed more restraint than the Yeomanry, with the majority using the flats of their swords to disperse the crowd, a small number used the cutting edges which inflicted serious wounds. In the same way the belief that only 11 people were killed and 400 injured has been disproved by recent research that has established that there were ‘at least 654 casualties, 18 of who died of their injuries.’ Finally, the belief that Manchester’s Irish population did not become integrated into the movement for parliamentary reform is also unfounded. Research has shown that at least ‘97 of the injuries recorded in the casualty lists of Peterloo were to persons of Irish extraction, either immigrants from Ireland or those born in England of Irish parents.’
Finally, in concluding Chapter Two it was shown that on 16th August 1819 a massive crowd had gathered in St Peter’s Field peacefully and carrying no weapons to put pressure on the government to bring about parliamentary reform. In spite of these factors and, on the orders of the Select Committee of Magistrates were ‘attacked by soldiers with sabres and bayonets, and by police with truncheons and staves.’ This latest historical research has revealed that there is no doubt that these injuries were inflicted by the authorities quite deliberately. The fact that the military and police attacked an unarmed crowd of civilians, including women and children, both in St Peter’s Field and in the streets surrounding it, goes to show that their real intention was to teach these people a terrifying and unforgettable lesson.
In Chapter Three it was demonstrated that although it became known as the Peterloo Massacre, the events in and around St. Peter’s Field on 16th August 1819 were regarded by both sides with a great deal of passion. The reformers were regarded with fear and suspicion by the establishment, and treated accordingly. This treatment resulted in further agitation which in turn led to increased repressive government reaction. When it came to the question of public order, the Government and the local authorities were ferocious in suppressing discontent, as the story of Peterloo illustrates. The first reaction of the Government to Peterloo was further repression, and the famous Six Acts were passed soon after Peterloo. They were intended to prevent large public meetings, suppress the radical press, and undermine the whole movement for radical reforms. Nevertheless, Peterloo was a turning point in British history. This was largely because the working-class gained a lot of middle-class sympathy.
In Chapter Four and throughout this book it was shown how right wing and left wing interpretations vary. Another major problem with in the historiography of Peterloo is of course, most historians have not based their research on primary source documentation and eye witness accounts. Instead the history of Peterloo has been largely based on the assumptions of previous writers and their analysis of the facts taken from secondary works and simply been repeated in every generation. However, I must agree with Robert Poole that ‘the contrived debate over ‘blame’ for the massacre has been unproductive and attempts to exonerate the Manchester authorities have been wholly unconvincing.’ Nevertheless, although the Manchester magistrates had initiated the policy of repression at Peterloo Lord Liverpool’s’ Government endorsed it with every means at its disposal. For example Henry Hunt, John Cartwright, Sir Francis Burdett, Richard Carlile, Sir Charles Wolsley and James Wroe of the Manchester Observer were only a few of those imprisoned or awaiting prosecution by the end of 1819.
Chapter Five demonstrates that Loyalist verse was jingoistic and triumphant and Radical verse was closer to the tragedy. In the words of Jim Clayson ‘looking at the working-class response to Peterloo through the popular literature it created gives us a new perspective on events. The radicals were concerned less with constitutional issues, they presupposed the meeting was legal, than with the behaviour of the new middle-classes. They perceived them to have formed an alliance with aristocratic government.’
In conclusion the Peterloo Massacre was the result of over-reaction by the Manchester authorities at what otherwise was likely to have been a peaceful demonstration. The brutal dispersal by cavalry on orders from the Manchester authorities of the Radical reform meeting in St Peter’s Field on 16th August 1819 bears witness to the profound fears of the privileged-classes in the years following the Napoleonic Wars. Nevertheless, Peterloo was a major turning point in British history. This was largely because the working-class gained a great deal of middle-class sympathy and support for their cause helped greatly by Shelley’s The Mask of Anarchy, and although the Government passed the notorious Six Acts to end all agitation it did not succeed and eventually came to see that government repression of a disenfranchised people would never work. For the working-classes, Peterloo came to symbolize the privileged high and mighty tyrannical Tory. Even today ‘Peterloo is a forcible and enduring reminder of the power of class in modern British society.’